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THE APPLICABILITY OF NAFTA TO THE
SUBSIDIZATION OF U.S.-BASED
NHL TEAMS: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
Terry Wu and Neil Longley*
I. INTRODUCTION
N recent years, there has been a proliferation of regional free trade
agreements worldwide. The major regional trading blocs are the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Southern Cone Customs Union (MERCOSUR), and the
Andean Pact.' When the framers of international trade agreements draft
various clauses in an agreement, they presumably have some pre-con-
ceived notions as to the types of situations to which each clause is in-
tended to apply. Sometimes, however, the legal drafting of the
agreement is such that it allows certain clauses to be used for purposes
not originally considered or intended by the framers.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA is one such example of this unintended applica-
tion. Chapter 11 requires the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican governments
to provide "fair and equitable treatment and full protection and secur-
ity' 2 to investments of foreign companies. Specifically, Chapter 11 allows
companies in a NAFTA country to sue governments of other NAFTA
member countries for compensation, if their investments have been hurt
by the host countries' laws or regulations.3 Thus, a private business could
initiate legal action against a foreign government under NAFTA, even
though NAFTA is an international trade agreement between sovereign
states.
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1. See CHARLEs W.L. HrLL, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss 232 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed.
2001).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, at art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. 605
[hereinafter NAFrA].
3. Id. at art. 1116.
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What was not anticipated by this free trade agreement was that certain
provisions in NAFTA would be used for situations not originally contem-
plated or intended by U.S., Canadian, and Mexican negotiators. The
NAFTA trade negotiators did not envision situations that go beyond
trade policy applications; however, since 1998, there have been more than
ten legal challenges launched under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agree-
ment.4 In 1998, for example, Ohio-based U.S. hazardous waste firm S.D.
Myers, Inc. filed claims against the Canadian government and sought
compensation, alleging unfair treatment and discrimination over a ban on
exports from Canada of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).5 In 1999, Cal-
ifornia-based U.S. company Metalclad Corporation sued the Mexican
government for blocking the construction of a toxic waste disposal site
due to environmental concerns. 6 In 2001, Canadian funeral giant The
Loewen Group, Inc. sued the U.S. government for damages stemming
from a $500 million Mississippi lawsuit in 1995. 7 The most recent case
was the legal action launched by Oregon forest giant Pope & Talbot, Inc.
against the Canadian government over released documents requested
under the Canadian access-to-information law. 8 These trade disputes
demonstrate that the framers of NAFTA did not foresee or even consider
these scenarios when they negotiated the trilateral free trade agreement.
This article explores another possible example of unintended conse-
quences in a free trade agreement. This example pertains to the profes-
sional sports industry. The particular issue considered here is whether
NA.FTA could be used to counter any government-induced financial ad-
vantages that U.S.-based National Hockey League (NHL) teams may
have over Canadian-based NHL teams.
In recent years, the majority of Canadian NHL franchises have encoun-
tered considerable financial stress, relative to their counterpart franchises
based in the United States.9 The reasons for this stress are varied. The
precipitous decline in the value of the Canadian dollar throughout the
1990s has been damaging. Canadian teams pay their players in U.S. dol-
lars, but earn most of their revenues in Canadian dollars. In addition, the
NHL has expanded rapidly during the 1990s, and has added a number of
large-market teams in the United States. Many of these teams, with their
location in large TV markets and their access to corporate support, have
considerably greater revenue-generating capacity than do most Cana-
4. U.S. Department of State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitration, at http://www.state.
gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
5. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Canada, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3746.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2003).
6. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3752.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
7. The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S., at http://www.state.gov/s/
I/c3755.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
8. GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 21, 2002.
9. See Angela Cocco & J.C.H. Jones, On Going South: The Economics of Survival
and Relocation of Small Market NHL Franchises in Canada, 29 APPLIED ECON.
1537.
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dian-based franchises. Furthermore, the most recent Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement between NHL players and owners, which gave players
increased free agency and arbitration rights, has rapidly escalated salaries
during the latter part of the 1990s.
Most important, at least for the purposes of this article, is the argument
made by some that U.S. NHL franchises have been in general the benefi-
ciaries of significant largesse from their local governments. The argument
is that many local governments in the United States, in an attempt to
attract or retain professional sports franchises, have been willing to build
or renovate stadiums with public dollars, and/or to subsidize the ongoing
operating costs of the stadium.
This article analyses whether the actions of these governments, and the
subsequent advantage that these actions allegedly confer on U.S.-based
franchises relative to Canadian-based franchises, are potentially actiona-
ble under NAFTA. Some have argued that numerous provisions in
NAFTA would apply to this situation and would, in fact, allow action to
be taken against U.S.-based teams. 10 This article explores some of these
legal arguments.
This article also attempts to explore whether any such actions would
fall within the original intent of such provisions. The professional sports
industry is unlike most other industries. Member franchises in a given
league, while competitors on the playing field, are actually partners in an
economic sense. This raises a question as to whether NAFTA was ever
intended to remedy intra-league inequities that arise due to some
franchises in a league receiving more government benefits than other
franchises in the league. Is this a matter for NAFTA, or is it simply an
internal matter to be dealt with within a league, since members of the
league collectively determine the rules on how the economic rents that
the league generates will be distributed among league members?
Before proceeding with such an analysis, some background on the in-
ternational nature of the North American professional sports industry is
provided.
II. THE NORTH AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS INDUSTRY
A. INTERNATIONALIZATION
The professional sports industry can be viewed as a sub-component of
the more broadly defined entertainment industry. A professional sports
league is essentially selling a service, the service of entertaining consum-
ers by providing on-field competitions between the leagues' member
franchises.
10. See, e.g., Barry Appleton & Marian Neceski, NAFTA and Sports, Submission to
the House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, Sub-Commit-
tee on the Study of Sports in Canada, 1998, at http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/
nafta&sports.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter NAFTA & Sports].
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There are numerous international aspects to the professional team
sports industry in the United States. First, the actual service, that is, the
staging of on-field competitions, is provided across international bounda-
ries. Of the four major professional sports leagues in the United States-
Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the
National Basketball League (NBA), and the National Hockey League
(NHL)-only the NFL has all of its franchises contained within the
boundaries of the United States. The MLB has two of its thirty franchises
located in Canada, the NBA has one of its twenty-nine franchises located
in Canada, and the NHL has six of its thirty franchises located in Canada.
Second, the source of professional players has become increasingly in-
ternationalized in recent years. Of the four major professional leagues,
only in the NFL is the player market almost exclusively comprised of
Americans. The league with the greatest degree of internationalization is
the NHL. In fact, until the early 1980s very few Americans had ever
played in the NHL; the league was dominated almost exclusively by
Canadians. For example, in 1972, only 3.8 percent of NHL players were
Americans." During the past three decades, the representation of Amer-
icans has increased significantly, to the point where they now represent
about i4.1 percent of NHL players.' 2
Even more significant is the increased representation of Europeans in
the NHL. Europeans first began entering the NHL during the early
1970s, most at that time were from Sweden, but up until the early 1990s,
they still comprised a relatively small percentage of NHL players. How-
ever, the fall of the Soviet bloc enabled Eastern European players to
come to North America, and the 1990s saw a rapid increase in the num-
ber of Europeans in the NHL. In fact, during the 2001-2002 season
Europeans comprised 33.6 percent of NHL players, up from 11.9 percent
in 1992, 8.2 percent in 1982, and 1.8 percent in 1972.13 Canadians, who
comprised 94.4 percent of all NHL players in 1972, currently comprise
52.3 percent of players. 14
The other three professional sports leagues have not seen such dra-
matic changes as the NHL, although both the NBA and MLB have seen
increased levels of internationalization during the past decade. The
NBA, like the NHL, benefited from the fall of the Soviet bloc, with a
number of Eastern European players entering the NBA during the 1990s.
In the MLB, players from Latin American countries have long comprised
a significant minority of players, but this internationalization has in-
creased in recent years with players from Asia now entering the major
leagues in increased numbers.




2003] SUBSIDIZATION OF U.S.-BASED NHL TEAMS 575
Given this internationalization of the North American professional
sports industry the question, then, is: to what extent, if any, might interna-
tional agreements such as NAFTA affect the industry?
In answering this question, perhaps the place to begin is to determine
what NAFTA does not affect. Unlike the EU, NAFTA does not allow for
free mobility of labor among its member countries. In essence, NAFTA
is only a free trade agreement, not a common market agreement, and, as
such, pertains only to the freer mobility of goods, services, and capital.
Because of this narrow focus, the international aspects of the market for
players, as described earlier, should not be affected by NAFTA. The is-
sue is raised here only because it is currently a relevant issue in European
professional sports. 15 The EU free mobility of labor provisions has had a
significant impact on the manner in which European professional soccer
teams are able to conduct player transactions. Unlike North American
sports, European teams have traditionally sold their players outright to
other teams, rather than trade players for other players. The revenues
the teams earn from selling a player's rights are deemed transfer fees, and
have been an important source of income for many European soccer
clubs. In 1995, however, the European Court of Justice, in the Bosman
case, ruled that these transfer fees violated the EU principle of free mo-
bility of labor among member countries. 16
Drawing a comparison to the NHL, any barriers that the NHL creates,
which limit the ability of players to move freely between teams, must also
necessarily limit the ability of players to move between teams in Canada
and the United States. Thus, if NAFA were ever modified to include
free mobility of labor the NHL's current system whereby teams losing
free agents are entitled to compensation from the player's new team
would be disallowed. Because such free mobility of labor is very unlikely
to occur in the near future the issue will not be examined any further in
this paper.
It would seem, then, that any potential applicability of NAFTA to pro-
fessional sports would come on the output side of the market, as opposed
to the input side. In this regard, NAFTA governs both trade rules and
investment rules. On the trade side, the professional sports industry pro-
duces a service, not a good, and hence the potentially relevant reference
points in the NA-FTA trade rules are those that apply to trade in services.
However, NAFTA rules on investment may also apply. Under certain
interpretations, a Canadian-based team playing a game in the United
States may be deemed to have an investment in the United States (and
vice-versa). This view is grounded in the fact that the NHL has a reve-
nue-sharing arrangement among its member clubs whereby Canadian
teams playing a game in the United States would gain, directly or indi-
rectly, part of the revenues that were generated from such a game.
15. See Thomas Ericson, The Bosman Case: Effects of the Abolition of the Transfer Fee,
Aug. 2000, J. SPORTS ECON. 203.
16. Id.
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B. SUBSIDIZATION
In this regard, a specific trade issue has recently arisen: if certain U.S.-
based NHL teams receive benefits from their governments that Cana-
dian-based NHL teams do not receive, are such government-induced ad-
vantages that accrue to U.S. teams potentially actionable under NAFrA?
Two questions are relevant to the issue. First, do U.S.-based teams actu-
ally receive such subsidies? Second, if they do, are such benefits actiona-
ble under NAFTA?
The first question has already been extensively examined elsewhere. 17
While Canadian-based franchises have often received some amount of
direct and indirect subsidization, the levels of such subsidization have
been relatively small compared to U.S.-based franchises. In the United
States, a highly competitive market for professional sports franchises has
developed, with local and state governments spending large amounts of
money to attract and retain franchises. The ability of sports leagues to
limit the supply of franchises has provided them with considerable lever-
age in negotiating with government leaders who are concerned that major
professional sports franchises are necessary if a city is to be considered
big league. These financial incentives have taken the form of both tax
exemptions and direct subsidies.
The government subsidization of stadium construction and operating
costs has been frequently employed as a means by which governments
have subsidized sports teams. It is widely held that both the stadiums and
the sports provide tangible economic benefits. Noll and Zimbalist argue:
A sports franchise is simply too small and earns too little profit to
pay the full cost of even a $200 million facility. But, of course, in
recent years almost no team has had to pay the full cost of its playing
facility. Local and state governments bear part - and sometimes vir-
tually all - of the stadium costs.18
In their submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Canadian Heritage, Appleton and Neceski cited two examples of govern-
ment subsidies to hockey teams based in the United States. 19 Both the
St. Louis Blues hockey team and the Nashville Predators hockey team
were provided with generous financial support from local governments. 20
In the case of the St. Louis Blues hockey team, the City of St. Louis pro-
vided the following financial incentives:
* Contribution of $62.5 million (U.S.) towards construction of the Kiel
Center financed by tax-exempt municipal bonds;
* $34 million (U.S.) to prepare the Kiel Center for construction and to
build a parking garage;
17. See generally ROGER G. NOLL & ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS AND
TAxEs: THE ECONOMIC IMPACr OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Brookings In-
stitution Press 1997).
18. See id. at 495.
19. NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10, at 2-3.
20. Id.
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" Rent-free access for use of the municipal land where the Kiel Center
is located;
" A municipal property tax abatement on the Kiel Center land for a
period of [twenty-five] years.21
Another example is the Nashville Predators hockey team, which re-
ceived generous financial benefits from the City of Nashville. These ben-
efits included:
" Use of a new arena, constructed by the City of Nashville, and fi-
nanced by tax-exempt municipal bonds;
* Payment by the City of Nashville of $20 million (U.S.) towards the
NHL expansion fee payable by the Predators;
" Subsidized rental payments for the arena capped at 5 [percent] of net
gate receipts on game days;
" 100 [percent] of all preferred seating and in-arena advertising
revenues;
" An exemption from all local property, business and school taxes.22
Under U.S. tax laws, the U.S. federal government also offers tax-free
status to interest generated by municipal bonds.2 3 Specifically, U.S. tax-
payers are not required to pay federal income tax on interest income
earned on municipal bonds, thereby allowing municipal governments to
pay a lower interest rate on debentures to finance sports facilities.24 In
essence, the lower financing cost may constitute a form of indirect federal
subsidies for sports teams that operate in the United States.
In contrast, Canadian sports teams generally have not received similar
levels of subsidies or tax exemptions from their governments. Unlike
their counterparts in the United States, Canadian sports teams generally
are required to pay not only for their own facilities, but also all local and
provincial taxes with no exemptions.
These issues raise two questions. First, does the literal interpretation of
the legal provisions of NAFTA potentially allow for actions to be taken
to counter the government-induced financial advantages that U.S.-based
teams possess? Second, even if one can, in fact, make a legal argument
for the applicability of NAFTA, is such an application consistent with the
original intent of NAFTA? The legal questions are examined in the fol-
lowing section, while the economic issues are examined in the subsequent
section.
III. A LEGAL ANALYSIS
While U.S. state and local governments may legally provide a variety of
financial benefits for U.S. sports teams under U.S. domestic laws, this
type of financial support does raise a number of legal issues with respect
to U.S. international trade obligations. For example, do these financial
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 2-3.
23. I.R.C. § 103 (2002).
24. NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10, at 3.
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benefits for U.S. sports teams constitute government subsidies, and, if so,
do they violate U.S. international trade obligations, particularly NAFTA?
A. DEFINITION OF A SUBSIDY
The issue of subsidies is always a controversial one in international
trade. The problem is that there is no universally accepted definition of
the term subsidy because subsidies can take so many different forms. A
major difficulty in defining a subsidy is the problem of differentiating be-
tween "subsidies granted by governments in pursuit of valid economic
and social policies and those which... have the effect of distorting world
trade and depriving other countries of legitimate trade opportunities. '25
What is considered a subsidy in one country may not be regarded as a
subsidy in another.
At the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of GATF negotiations in 1979,
member countries agreed to the Subsidies Code as the basis for dealing
with the subsidy issue. However, most countries were dissatisfied with
the 1979 Subsidies Code. The Subsidies Code was considered to be inef-
fective in dealing with trade disputes because it failed to expressly define
the term subsidy,26 and to establish criteria for determining if an injury
had been caused by a subsidy.
To remedy the situation, one of the negotiating objectives of the Uru-
guay Round was to develop a definition of the term subsidy that was
acceptable to most countries. As a result of the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations in 1994, the Subsidies Code was replaced by the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agree-
ment). The new agreement was an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of
the 1979 Subsidies Code. The SCM Agreement clarified the definition of
subsidy as "a financial contribution provided directly or indirectly by a
government which confers a benefit. ' 27 According to this definition, a
subsidy consists of two elements: (1) a financial contribution by a govern-
ment, and (2) a benefit conferred.
1. Financial Contribution
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines a financial contribution by a
government as: (a) direct transfers of funds (e.g., grants, loans, etc.), (b)
potential direct transfers of funds (e.g., loan guarantees), (c) the forego-
ing of revenues (e.g., tax credits or tax exemptions), (d) the provision of
goods and services other than general infrastructure programs, and (e)
the granting of any form of price or income support.28 In essence, subsi-
dies could be made, directly or indirectly, by a government or through its
25. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Report by the Director-
General of GATT 53 (1979).
26. JOHN KRAUs, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS: A BusiNEss GUIDE TO THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 33 (1993).
27. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at art. 1 (1994).
28. Id.
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agencies (either public or private). 29
2. Benefit to the Recipient
The mere existence of a financial contribution, in itself, is not sufficient
to constitute a subsidy. To meet the requirement for a subsidy, the finan-
cial contribution must confer a benefit to the recipient.30 That is, a bene-
fit exists when a subsidy creates a competitive advantage for the recipient.
Based on the above discussions, two basic elements, financial contribu-
tion and benefit to the recipient, are necessary for a subsidy. In essence,
the SCM Agreement makes the definition of a subsidy much more trans-
parent and clear. Moreover, the definition refers only to specific subsi-
dies, that is, subsidies that target (a) a specific enterprise or industry, (b)
specific groups of enterprises or industries, or (c) enterprises in a particu-
lar region.31 It should be noted that several types of subsidies are explic-
itly excluded, including: (a) non-specific subsidies, (b) certain specific
subsidies defined in the Agreement, and (c) agricultural subsidies, which
are governed by the Agreement on Agriculture. 32
The SCM Agreement further clarified the definition of a specific sub-
sidy by classifying subsidies into three categories:
(1) Prohibited subsidies, known as red light subsidies, are subsidies
that World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries are not
allowed to use under any circumstances. These subsidies include
de facto export subsidies to enhance export performance, 33 and
subsidies based on the manufacturer's use of domestic, instead of
imported, goods for production.34 Since these subsidies are re-
garded as trade distorting, member countries are prohibited from
using them. 35
(2) Actionable subsidies, or yellow light subsidies, are subsidies that
may or may not be trade distorting, depending upon how they are
actually applied. 36 These subsidies may be considered as trade dis-
torting if they (a) injure a domestic industry of another member
state,37 (b) nullify or impair benefits due to another member state
under GATT 1994,38 or (c) cause or threaten to cause serious
prejudice to the interests of another member state. 39 That is, these
subsidies are actionable if they cause adverse trade effects in other
member countries. While these subsidies are permissible, member
29. Id.
30. Id
31. Id. at art. 2.
32. RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BuslNEss LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND READINGS, 406
(3d ed., Prentice Hall 2000).
33. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at art. 3, para. l(a).
34. Id. at art. 3, para. l(b).
35. Id. at art. 3, para. 2.
36. AUGUST, supra note 32, at 407.
37. Id.
38. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at art. 5.
39. Id. at art. 6, para. 3.
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countries are discouraged from using them.40
(3) Non-actionable subsidies, known as green light subsidies, are subsi-
dies that WTO member countries are allowed to use, and these
subsidies are off-limits to domestic enforcement actions under cer-
tain circumstances. 4 1 These subsidies are normally used for infra-
structure and are permissible if they (a) contribute to the costs of
research activities carried on by business firms, (b) assist disadvan-
taged regions, or (c) assist existing facilities to adapt to new envi-
ronmental requirements. 4 2
As discussed previously, U.S.-based NHL teams were provided with
generous financial support from local governments through the subsidiza-
tion of stadium construction and operating costs. Does this type of finan-
cial support constitute a subsidy under international trade rules?
Using the definition developed in the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is
defined as a financial contribution provided directly or indirectly by a
government which confers a benefit.4 3 It appears that the financial bene-
fits for the U.S. teams may constitute a subsidy because the two elements,
a financial contribution by a government, and a benefit to the recipient,
do exist.
Under international trade rules, the specific subsidies provided to the
U.S.-based NHL teams may fall into the category of actionable subsidies.
The reason is that the U.S. subsidies, which benefit only the U.S.-based
teams, may cause or threaten to cause harm to the professional sports
industry in Canada.
B. NAFTA PROVISIONS
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a compre-
hensive free trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.44 The trilateral free trade agreement came into effect in January
of 1994. Although NAFTA is a free trade agreement, it has devoted a
considerable amount of text to foreign investment issues. There are at
least seven chapters devoted to the removal of barriers to foreign
investment.
Prior to the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, the United States al-
ready had a free trade agreement with Canada. This bilateral free trade
agreement was the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (ETA).4 5 In es-
sence, NAFTA is an extension of the FTA with some modifications.
It should be noted that while only the national governments of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico were signatories to NAFTA all levels
40. Id. at art. 5.
41. See, e.g., PAUL C. ROSENTHAL & LYNN E. DUFFY, Key Substantive Changes to U.S.
Countervailing Duty Law Under the Uruguay Round, 9 INT'L Q. 149 (1997).
42. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at art. 8, para. 2.
43. Id. at art. 1.
44. See NAFTA, supra note 2.
45. See Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 281
(1988) [hereinafter FrA].
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of government in a NAFTA country are legally bound by the terms and
obligations of the trade agreement.46 Article 105 of NAFTA states: "The
Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give
effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including their observance,
except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial
governments.
47
While NAIFTA is an international agreement between sovereign states,
it does govern the relationship between the governments of NAFTA
countries and private citizens (for example business investors). A
NAFTA country may fail to meet its NAFTA obligations if a lower level
of government violates the provisions of NAFTA. Thus, it is in the inter-
ests of all national governments to ensure that their lower levels of gov-
ernment comply with the NAFTA provisions.
It should be noted that a private citizen or a private business could
initiate legal actions against a foreign government under NAIFTA. In one
of the recent cases, a NAFTA tribunal ruled that S.D. Myers, Inc., an
Ohio-based waste disposal company, was damaged by a Canadian law
that banned the export of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a toxin and
suspected carcinogen. 48 The award could be as high as $50 million (U.S.),
as it was in that case.49 In another case, Ethyl Corporation, a Virginia-
based company, forced the Canadian government to overturn a ban on
the gasoline additive methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl
(MMT). The ban was originally introduced as result of environmental
concerns.50 These cases illustrate that a private citizen or business can
bring a claim when a NAFTA country has not met its NAFTA
obligations.
1. Sports as an Investment
The professional sports industry is a big business in the United States.
Major sports teams generate millions of dollars in business activities
through ticket sales, the sale of media rights, and through corporate spon-
sorships. Sports teams are not only business ventures, but are service
providers, sales promoters, employers, and investors. For many commu-
nities, a professional sports team also adds an inherent intangible value
for the local community.51
Under NAFTA, the definition of an investment has been broadened to
include virtually all business activities. Are professional sports consid-
ered an investment under NAFTA? To answer this question, it is neces-
sary to review the relevant provisions of NAFTA.
46. NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10, at 6.
47. NAFrA, supra note 2, at art. 105.
48. NAFTA Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10, at 7.
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2. Definition of an Investment
The definition of an investment is very broad under NAFTA. Invest-
ment includes most business activities owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by an investor in a NAFTA country. 52 Article 1139 defines
investment as:
[(a)] an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in
income or profits of the enterprise;
[(b)] real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in
the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or
other business purposes; and
[(c)] interests arising from the commitment of capital or other re-
sources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such
territory, such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in
the territory of the Party, including turnkey or construction
contracts, or concessions, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the
production, revenues or profits of an enterprise[.] 53
Canadian sports teams are types of enterprises that entitle the owners
to a share in income or profits. For example, Canadian hockey teams
playing in the United States are allowed to share in pooled profits
through revenues earned from television broadcasting rights. This consti-
tutes an investment as defined by article 1139. Moreover, other property,
such as the intellectual property rights owned by Canadian sports teams,
generates economic returns for their teams when they are playing in the
United States.54 Again, this constitutes an investment as defined in para-
graph (g) of article 1139. Thus, Canadian sports teams operating in the
United States are investments under the NAFTA definition. As such,
they are guaranteed the benefits and protection of NAFTA investment
provisions.
3. Obligations under NAFTA
Under NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have agreed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the trilateral agreement. As pre-
viously discussed, all levels of government in a NAFTA country are re-
quired to meet the obligations of NAFTA, even though the national
governments were the signatories to the Agreement. 55 With respect to
investment issues relating to professional sports teams, there are two im-
portant provisions in the NAIFTA investment chapter: (1) national treat-
ment and (2) performance requirements. In this section, we discuss these
two provisions and implications of each of these in relation to the status
of professional sports teams.
52. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1139.
53. Id.
54. NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10.
55. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 105.
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a. National Treatment
A major commitment of NAFTA is the national treatment status of
investments. Article 1102 states:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circum-
stances, to investments of its own investors with respect to the estab-
lishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation,
and sale or other disposition of investments.
3. The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means,
with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than
the most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by
that state or province to investors, and to investments of investors,
of the Party of which it forms a part.56
Article 1102 states that investments among the United States, Canada,
and Mexico are subject to national treatment. Each NAFTA country
must treat investors and investments of another NAFTA member country
no less favorably than it treats its own domestic investors in like circum-
stances. This means that U.S. laws and regulations must be applied
equally to U.S. and Canadian investors operating in the United States.
The national treatment provision of NAFTA requires all investors and
investments of another NAFTA member country to be treated as if they
were domestic investors and investments in "like circumstances. '57
While NAFTA does not explain what like circumstances would be, it is
reasonable to assume that this concept is probably the same as the one
used by GATT in dealing with the national treatment issue. 58 In interna-
tional trade rulings, it is customary to use the terms like circumstances,
similar situation, or similar business activities. For example, if two com-
panies engage in similar business activities (e.g., establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, and the like), then they are in like circumstances. For
this reason, it can be argued that two sports teams playing the same sport
(for example, hockey), in a NAFTA country, are in like circumstances.
Furthermore, article 1105(1) stipulates: "Each Party shall accord to in-
vestments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with in-
ternational law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security." 59 Under this definition, all investors of another NAFTA
member country must be treated equitably and guaranteed full protection
and security with respect to their investments.
56. Id. at art. 1102.
57. It
58. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, at art. III, para. 4.
59. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1105.
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Under NAFTA, the national treatment obligation requires all levels of
the U.S. government (local, state, and federal) to treat Canadian invest-
ments (such as Canadian hockey teams) as if they were domestic U.S.
investments (U.S. hockey teams). This national treatment obligation ap-
plies to "establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation and sale or other disposition of investments. '60 As discussed
earlier, U.S. hockey teams do receive direct subsidies and tax exemptions
from a variety of government sources. In contrast, Canadian hockey
teams do not receive similar benefits when they operate in the United
States. The financial incentives offered to U.S. teams, but not to Cana-
dian teams, may thus violate the national treatment provision of NAFTA.
b. Performance Requirements
Under NAFrA, a member country is not allowed to impose certain
restrictions on the investments of another country. The NAFTA invest-
ment chapter explicitly bans restrictions on business practices involving
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, or opera-
tion of an investment.
In an attempt to prohibit the use of performance requirements to regu-
late foreign investment, article 1106(1) states: "No Party may impose or
enforce any of the following requirements, or enforce any commitment or
undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expan-
sion, management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor
of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory."'61
The language used in article 1106(1) extends the non-discriminatory
treatment to all investors in terms of performance requirements. It
should be noted that these performance requirements apply not only to
investors from a NAFTA member country, but also to investors from
non-NAFTA countries. This means that all investors are subject to per-
formance requirements, regardless of whether they are from a NAFTA
member country or not. In other words, a NAIFTA country cannot im-
pose any performance requirements on foreign investors, even if these
investors are from non-NAFTA member countries.
Seven types of business practices, including minimum domestic content
and domestic sourcing requirements, are explicitly prohibited under
NAFTA. Article 1106(1) prohibits the following measures:
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or
services provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services
from persons in its territory.62
Thus, any requirements on the use of local goods and services would be
a violation of NAFTA provisions as defined in article 1106(1)(b) and (c).
60. Id. at art. 1102(2).
61. Id. at art. 1106(1).
62. Id.
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In the context of professional sports, article 1106(1) would seem to specif-
ically disallow government actions that would require a sports team to
operate in a particular location (a local service requirement). 63
4. Sports as a Service
Professional sports are, by and large, an entertainment industry that
can fall into the service category. Given the growing importance of the
service industry in the global economy, most international trade agree-
ments have incorporated the service sector into their provisions. In the
case of professional hockey teams, they normally play on either side of
the U.S.-Canada border. In essence, these professional teams are a ser-
vice provider on a cross-border basis. The crucial question is: Are profes-
sional sports teams a cross-border service under NAFTA? In order to
answer this question, a review of the relevant chapter in NAFTA is re-
quired. Chapter 12 specifically deals with the cross-border trade in
services.
5. Definition of Service
In the NAFTA service chapter, article 1213(2) states:
For purposes of this Chapter:
cross-border provision of a service or cross-border trade in services
means the provision of a service:
(a) from the territory of a Party into the territory of another
Party,
(b) in the territory of a Party by a person of that Party to a person
of another Party, or
(c) by a national of a Party in the territory of another Party,
but does not include the provision of a service in the territory of a
Party by an investment, as defined in Article 1139 (Investment Defi-
nitions), in that territory[.] 64
Although professional sports are generally viewed as a service, the lan-
guage used in article 1213(2) explicitly excludes it from this consideration.
Under NAFTA, professional sports are considered an investment, as de-
fined by article 1139, rather than a service. Hence, the service chapter of
NAFTA would not seem to be applicable to the issue under
consideration. 65
6. Cultural Exemptions
As is the case with the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
there are some exceptions and exemptions in NAFTA. For example, cul-
tural industries are specifically exempt from NAFTA. Chapter 21 deals
63. See NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10.
64. NAFrA, supra note 2, at art. 1213(2).
65. See NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10.
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with the application of the exemption for culture contained in the Agree-
ment. Article 2106 states, "Annex 2106 applies to the Parties specified in
that Annex with respect to cultural industries. '66 Annex 2106 states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between
Canada and the United States, any measure adopted or maintained
with respect to cultural industries, except as specifically provided in
Article 302 (Market Access - Tariff Elimination), and any measure of
equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed
under this Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions
of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. The rights and
obligations between Canada and any other Party with respect to such
measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada and
the United States. 67
Since cultural industries are exempt from NAFTA, how about profes-
sional sports? Are professional sports granted an exemption under the
cultural provisions of NAFTA? Many Canadians view hockey as an inte-
gral part of the Canadian culture, and, if professional hockey is indeed
recognized as an element of culture, then it is reasonable to assume that it
would be exempted from free trade rules contained in NAFTA. Does
NAFTA include professional sports such as hockey in the list of cultural
industries? It is worthwhile to review the definition of cultural industries
in NAFTA.
With respect to the definition of cultural industries, article 2107
stipulates:
For purposes of this Chapter:
cultural industries means persons engaged in any of the following
activities:
(a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, peri-
odicals or newspapers in print or machine readable form but not
including the sole activity of printing or typesetting any of the
foregoing;
(b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video
recordings;
(c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or
video music recordings;
(d) the publication, distribution or sale of music in print or ma-
chine readable form; or
(e) radio communications in which the transmissions are intended
for direct reception by the general public, and all radio, television
and cable broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming
and broadcast network services.68
66. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 2106.
67. Id. Annex 2106.
68. Id. at art. 2107.
2003] SUBSIDIZATION OF U.S.-BASED NHL TEAMS 587
Article 2107 clearly identifies five cultural industries: printed publica-
tions, film and video, music recording, music publishing, and broadcast-
ing. Professional sports are not included in the list of cultural industries
as defined by NAFTA. For this reason, there is no cultural exemption for
professional sports in NAFTA. 69
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The previous section shows that one could argue that certain provisions
of NAFTA, strictly applied, may allow action to be taken to counter the
government-induced financial advantages that U.S.-based teams possess.
An important question, however, still remains; in particular, would such
an action be consistent with the original intent of NAFTA?
One must recognize that, while agreements that liberalize trade and
investment are legal in nature, basic economic principles underlie these
legal agreements. The formal legal agreements are the operational means
by which the parties achieve economic outcomes.
This section analyzes whether the alleged benefits that U.S. NHL
teams receive from local governments are the types of economic behavior
that NAFTA was designed to address. To better analyze this issue, it is
necessary to first examine the economic rationales for trade liberaliza-
tion, and then to analyze the extent to which the NHL issue is compatible
with such rationales.
A. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR TRADE AND
INVEsTMENT LIBERALIZATION
According to classical trade theory, free trade is beneficial because it
allows countries (that is, its citizens) to capture the gains of production
specialization. 70 A country manufactures and exports those products in
which it has a comparative advantage, and imports those products in
which other countries have a comparative advantage. This results in the
most efficient, cost-effective, production of a particular good.
Barriers to trade artificially increase the price of foreign-produced
goods relative to domestically produced goods. These barriers tend to
take one of two primary forms, they may penalize foreign goods entering
the country through either tariff or non-tariff trade barriers, or they may
assist domestically produced goods through such mechanisms as subsi-
dies. In either case, the foreign-produced good is put at an artificial dis-
advantage. Trade barriers are often politically appealing, since the
benefits of such protectionist policies can be conferred on a narrow, but
often politically powerful, group of domestic producers, while the costs of
such protectionism are widely dispersed across many consumers.
69. See NAFTA & Sports, supra note 10.
70. PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THE-
ORY AND POLICY 21-23 (Addison-Wesley, 4th ed. 1997).
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As an alternative to exporting goods to a foreign country, some firms
will decide to invest directly in production facilities in that country. This
foreign direct investment (FDI) is particularly attractive where exporting
is hampered by market imperfections, such as tariffs or quotas, or where
transportation costs are high. Again, as in the case with international
trade, classical theory suggests that barriers to FDI increase inefficiency,
and lower social welfare.71 Unrestricted FDI ensures that goods are pro-
duced in those locations where they can be produced most efficiently.
Just as governments have political incentives to erect barriers to inhibit
the flow of imports into their country, they also often have incentives to
restrict the flow of FDI into their country. For example, domestic pro-
ducers may lobby governments to restrict the FDI of firms whose output
will compete directly with the domestic producer. FDI also often meets
with ideological opposition from some in the host country. It may, for
example, be viewed as a form of imperialistic domination, or as a threat
to the economic sovereignty of a nation.
In light of these political pressures, governments in host countries may
respond in one of many different ways. In some cases, ownership restric-
tions are employed, whereby foreign investors are either prevented out-
right from owning assets in the industry, or if allowed to own assets, are
prevented from having an ownership stake in a firm that is above a cer-
tain specified limit. Another policy frequently used to regulate FDI is to
enact performance requirements on foreign investors. These perform-
ance requirements often take the form of local content requirements, re-
quiring firms, for example, to create a certain number of new jobs for
local workers, or, perhaps, requiring firms to buy a certain percentage of
inputs from local suppliers. Another potential technique to disadvantage
foreign investors, relative to domestic firms, is to supply certain subsides,
grants, transfers, tax abatements, and the like, only to domestically-
owned firms.72
The trade of services, as opposed to goods, is also becoming increas-
ingly important in the global economy. Because services, by their very
nature, cannot be exported (that is, they must be produced and consumed
in the same physical location), they require the foreign provider of the
service to be physically present in the foreign country. Again, as with
FDI, host countries can erect barriers to such trade, sometimes through
outright prohibition of the foreign service provider, or sometimes
through the enactment of performance requirements on the foreign ser-
vice provider.
Trade agreements such as NAFTA are rooted in the notion that gov-
ernment policies that distort trade and investment flows create economic
inefficiency. The driving economic principle behind freer trade is that
market prices faced by consumers should reflect true costs of production,
and should not be artificially distorted by government policies. The com-
71. See CHARLES W. HILL, INTERNATIONAL Bus-Ess, 198-217 (2d ed. 1997).
72. Id.
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petitive, unregulated, market place is seen as the best means to achieve
such outcomes.
Free trade agreements, then, attempt to limit or eliminate government
policies that distort trade and investment flows. On the trade side, free
trade agreements remove all tariffs and quotas. They often also include
provisions to ensure that other trade-distorting policies, such as adminis-
trative trade rules, are not used for protectionist purposes. On the invest-
ment side, and also with respect to trade in services, free trade
agreements typically set out policies that ensure that foreign firms are not
discriminated against. For example, if governments impose performance
requirements on firms, such requirements must apply to both foreign in-
vestors and domestic investors. So-called national treatment ensures that
foreign investors compete on a level playing field in the foreign country.
In essence, free trade polices attempt to promote competition. Free
trade policies are intended to ensure that, in any given market, competi-
tive advantages are not artificially skewed towards local producers or in-
vestors. They are based on the principle that competitive advantages
should be the result of true efficiency advantages, and should not merely
be the result of government policies.
B. THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS INDUSTRY
The economic organization of the professional sports industry in North
America is distinctively different from that of most other industries. Un-
derstanding this peculiar economic organization is crucial to understand-
ing the potential international trade issues involved.
The most distinctive feature of the sports industry is that, even though
individual franchises within in a sports league are separate legal and busi-
ness entities, and are individually owned, each franchise also has a strong
mutual interdependency with other franchises in the league. Thus, while
the member franchises of a league may compete with each other on the
field, their off-field relationship is one based as much on cooperation as it
is on competition.
For example, franchises within a given league collaborate to adopt a set
of rules to which all league members must adhere. These rules regulate
not only the actual on-field competitions, but also regulate a wide variety
of administrative and economic matters, such as the means by which the
labor inputs (that is, the players) will be allocated to the various teams,
and the means by which revenues will be shared among the teams, etc.
One of the most important ways in which teams in North American
sports leagues act collaboratively, is in their ability to control entry into
their league. Prospective entrants into a league must be granted a
franchise by the league's existing members, and then must pay a large
franchise fee to the existing members upon entry. Leagues also limit the
supply of new franchises, usually adding only a few per decade, at most.
This ensures that the supply of new franchises remains well below the
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demand for those franchises, thus increasing the prices of all franchises
within the league.
This strict control over entry results in what is termed a closed league,
and is something that is generally unique to North American professional
sports leagues. For example, in English football (soccer), membership in
England's twenty-team top professional league, the Premier League,
changes from year to year. Each year, the three lowest teams from the
Premier League are relegated to the First Division, while the three best
teams from the First Division are promoted to the Premier League. In
total, there are four different divisions in English football, and upstart
teams can, at least in theory, eventually gain access to the Premier
League by joining the lowest division and then eventually gaining succes-
sive promotions so as to eventually reach the Premier League.
In North America, however, league membership is an exclusive club.
Thus, it could be argued that North American sports leagues act more
like single entities than do sports leagues in other countries. In North
America's closed leagues, membership is fixed, and stable from year to
year.
C. UNINTENDED APPLICATIONS?
Given the supposed advantages that U.S.-based NHL teams receive,
relative to their Canadian-based counterparts, would any possible action,
under NAFTA, against U.S.-based NHL teams be consistent with the un-
derlying economic intent of NAFTA?
The issue is fairly complex. The basic question, however, is whether
the subsidization of some teams within a professional sport, to the possi-
ble detriment of other teams within the same league, is the type of eco-
nomic and competitive issue that trade agreements such as NAFTA were
designed to address.
To address this question, it is necessary to characterize the nature of
the economic competition within the North American professional sports
industry. In particular, the crucial question is whether teams within a
given league can be viewed as economic competitors.
To answer this question, one must revisit the purpose of trade laws.
Trade laws attempt to enhance economic efficiency within a given market
by removing artificial distortions within that market. Clearly, a key issue
here is the definition of the term market. While there is no single opera-
tional definition of the term, one could argue that firms could be consid-
ered to be in the same market if they attempt to serve the same group of
customers. For example, to take a non-sports situation, steel companies
in Canada and the United States compete for the same group of custom-
ers. A zero-sum game exists: a contract won by a Canadian company
cannot be won by the U.S. company. Thus, if a government in the United
States subsidizes an American steel company, but does not offer the same
subsidy to a Canadian steel company, that subsidization gives the Ameri-
can steel company a competitive advantage when dealing with customers,
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whether those customers are in the United States, Canada, or some third-
country.
It can be argued, however, that the NHL situation is fundamentally
different than this traditional situation. For example, the Toronto Maple
Leafs and the Chicago Black Hawks, two teams in the NHL, are clearly
competitors on the ice. However, in an economic sense, the teams oper-
ate in different markets, and are not generally competing for the same
group of customers. The economic market in which the team operates is
the entertainment market within the city in which it is located. The To-
ronto Maple Leafs compete in the entertainment market in the city of
Toronto, while the Chicago Black Hawks compete in the broader en-
tertainment market in the city of Chicago. Both teams compete for the
entertainment dollar of consumers in their respective cities. In this sense,
the competitors of the Toronto Maple Leafs are the Toronto Blue Jays
and the Toronto Raptors, while the competitors of the Chicago Black
Hawks are the Chicago Bulls, the Chicago Cubs, and the like. Both
teams also compete with other entertainment alternatives in their cities,
such as amusement parks, the arts, and the like. During the 1970s, when
the World Hockey Association (WHA) existed, both teams also faced
direct competition from rival hockey teams: the Toronto Toros, and the
Chicago Cougars.
The Toronto Maple Leafs and the Chicago Black Hawks cannot be
considered economic competitors. For example, if one team increases its
attendance, or increases the size of its TV contract, this does not harm the
financial performance of other team. In fact, it may even help the other
team to the extent the league has a revenue-sharing arrangement. For
teams in a sports league, its competitors, at least in an economic sense,
are firms outside the league. Thus, if the role of free trade agreements is
to enhance economic competition, the problems Canadian NHL teams
face would seem to fall outside of these bounds.
The idea that franchises within a given league are not economic com-
petitors is reinforced by examining league rules regarding franchise loca-
tions. All leagues grant their existing franchises territorial rights. This
means that the league can add no new franchises within a certain geo-
graphic distance from an existing franchise. This is intended to protect
the market for that existing franchise.
As a further economic argument against applying trade laws to the
NHL situation, any financial disparities that exist across teams are the
result of fundamental choices made by the league's member teams, of
which the owner's of individual teams are voluntary members. A more
egalitarian distribution of revenues is possible, as in the NFL, but has
been rejected by the NHL. Thus, one could make a strong argument that
the issue is not a trade problem, in any traditional economic sense, but
rather is simply an internal issue that must be resolved by league
members.
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This is not to suggest that there may not be situations where trade pol-
icy might be applicable. For example, suppose an upstart professional
hockey league was formed to challenge the NHL. Assume this upstart
league located a team in St. Louis and that this team was owned by a
Canadian. If the City of St. Louis refused to offer the same deal to the
Canadian-owned team in the upstart league as it did to American-owned
Blues in the NHL, then the Blues would gain a competitive advantage in
the St. Louis hockey market. As an alternative example, if a government
in the United States offered subsidies contingent on the U.S.-based team
being owned by an American, such an act would clearly be a violation of
NAF-A.73
V. CONCLUSION
Under a strict interpretation of certain legal provisions in NAFTA, one
could argue that Canadian-based NHL teams operating in the United
States could constitute an investment. Hence, these Canadian-based
teams are guaranteed the benefits and protection of NAFTA provisions.
Unlike the U.S.-based hockey teams, Canadian teams receive much fewer
direct subsidies and tax exemptions from their governments. The finan-
cial incentives offered to U.S. teams, but not to Canadian teams, may
have violated the national treatment provisions of NAFTA. Hence, an
argument can be made that Canada would have grounds to initiate a legal
action against the United States, and seek compensation under NAFTA.
At the same time, however, there remains a question as to whether the
framers of NAFTA intended these provisions to be applied to such a situ-
ation. An argument can be made that such an application is inconsistent
with the economic rationales that underlie the legal provisions, in that
franchises within a league are as much economic partners as they are
competitors, hence implying that any imbalances are the result of volun-
tary and mutually agreed-upon decisions by league members.
73. For example, Mario Lemieux, a Canadian, is part owner of the Pittsburgh Pen-
guins, and George Gillette, an American, is owner of the Montreal Canadiens. If a
situation arose where either of these teams were refused local subsides because of
the nationality of the team's owner, trade laws may have relevancy.
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